This paper presents a theoretical model emphasising energy investments' characteristics of uncertainty and irreversibility. The theoretical model suggests threshold effects. Firms are induced to substitute away from energy only if prices of energy exceed a certain threshold level and they reverse the technology only if energy prices are low enough. Estimating a simple investment relation using panel data for the Dutch economy, we find evidence for threshold effects.
Introduction
Governments of most developed countries aim to substantially reduce energy use to limit the emission of greenhouse gases (such as carbon dioxide). The effectiveness of taxing energy use depends on the substitution elasticity between inputs in production and on technological progress. Analysis of past experience may give insight in the potential effectiveness of energy taxation to induce a decrease in energy use. This idea has been applied at various levels in the economy. The literature focusing at the sectoral level, initiated by Hamilton (1988) , attacks the idea that production factors are able to relocate smoothly from one sector to another. If production factors (mainly capital and labour) are specialised, it may be optimal not to immediately leave adversely affected sectors and to move to positively affected sectors, but to remain unemployed and wait for conditions to improve. At the micro level, firms are likely to postpone irreversible investment expenditures on both energy-saving technologies and their reversal towards energy-intensive technologies (see for example Bernanke, 1983) . This means that firms will not respond immediately to energy price increases; but if they have responded, energy prices will have to fall substantially before the investment is reversed.
Empirical studies seem to corroborate this explanation of asymmetric responses. At the micro-economic level there is evidence pointing to the fact that firms and consumers adapt faster (and stronger) to energy price increases than to price decreases (e.g. Bacon, 1991; Borenstein et al., 1997; Gately, 1992; Kirchgässner and Kübler, 1992; Mork, 1989; Ryan et al., 1996) . At the macro-level, asymmetries may also be important. It has been observed that economic activity is more strongly affected by increases in the energy price than by decreases (Dargay and Gately, 1994; Gardner and Joutz, 1996; Mork et al., 1994; Mory, 1993; Smyth, 1993) . However, not all price increases will have an equally strong impact on investments in energy-saving technologies. If energy prices increase after a period of 4 low prices, the change is merely a recovery that is unlikely to induce additional investments in energy efficiency. Only "all time highs" will induce new investments in energy efficiency (Hamilton, 1996) . If such an asymmetric response exists, it has important policy implications. Currently, energy prices are relatively low after a period of significant price increases (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) . This means that (part of the) industry has already geared its technology to higher energy prices in the past.
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Increasing energy tax rates (as part of environmental policy) in a situation where energy prices are low after a period of high energy prices is therefore expected not to have a strong impact on investment behavior and technology choice, and thus results in only modest reductions in energy use. More likely, firms are forced to simply incur the rise in costs. This means that in order to achieve a substantial reduction in energy use, energy prices should be increased considerably with potentially high costs in terms of, for example, international competitiveness. However, in the post-1986 period, energy prices are much lower and also less subject to fluctuations. Given the positive correlation between the level of energy prices and their variance (e.g. Ferderer, 1996) , uncertainty is likely to be smaller in the post-1986 period. As this may also affect the responsiveness of Dutch industry to changes in energy prices (and hence to taxation), the impact of uncertainty should be analyzed. To explore the consequences of irreversibility and uncertainty for the environmental effectiveness of energy taxation in the Netherlands, the mechanisms behind asymmetric responses are elucidated through the use of a simple investment model presented in the next section.
On the basis of this model we show that, following a period of energy price increases, prices will have to drop substantially before energy-saving technologies are to be replaced by energy-intensive ones. This drop is likely to be larger (i) the higher the adjustment costs, (ii) the faster energy prices are expected to increase over time and (iii) the higher uncertainty about future prices. On the other hand if prices do not 5 drop enough, i.e. not enough to replace energy-saving technologies with more energy intensive ones, energy price increases will not have much impact on energy use, suggesting that energy policy in periods of low energy prices will not be very effective.
The next section presents a theoretical model which shows that there are threshold effects to explain these asymmetries. Section 3 discusses the implications of the theoretical model. In section 4, an empirical analysis is undertaken for eight sectors of Dutch industry to estimate these threshold effects. Section 5 concludes.
Investing under uncertainty
In this section, an illustration is provided why asymmetric reponses to energy price changes referred to in the previous section may arise. In order to keep things simple we assume that the price of labour (W) is constant and known, but that future energy prices (P E ) are uncertain. Since most types of energy currently employed come from depletable resources, we assume a time trend for prices, but disturbances may force the energy price to deviate from its trend path. More specifically, the energy price is assumed to follow a Brownian motion:
(1)
In this equation, α is the trend parameter and dt dz ε = , where ε is a normally distributed independent variable with a zero mean and a standard deviation of 1. This
P dt E (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 70-71) . Therefore, the expected energy price at time t equals:
where E o refers to the starting period.
Now the costs and benefits of switching from the energy-intensive technology to the labour-intensive technology can be determined. The change in technology results in savings on energy expenses, but expenditures on labour increase. Taking into account the adjustment costs C A , the value of switching to labour-intensive (and hence energy-saving) technology equals:
where r is the (exogenously determined) discount rate which exceeds the drift term
The results have been derived using dynamic programming, which is based on the assumption that the price risk cannot be spanned by constructing an appropriate market portfolio. If we would have dropped this (implicit) assumption, contingent claims analysis could be used which would have enabled us to derive a risk-adjusted discount rate. Using the capital asset market pricing approach, this discount rate would be equal to r
After implementing the labour-intensive technology, the firm may decide to reverse its investment if the price of energy is sufficiently low (see below). For a certain energy price level P E , the value of this reversal option equals:
Which energy price level is sufficiently high to induce the firm to switch towards the energy-saving (i.e. labour-intensive) technology? In each period, the firm compares the benefits of undertaking the investment (in terms of cost reductions achieved) with the benefits of postponing the decision one period. The benefits of postponing the decision include access to more information about energy prices. Given the uncertainty that the firm faces, postponing the decision reduces the probability of investing when such an investment turns out to be unprofitable. In mathematical terms, the firm maximizes:
The value Ω ES E P ( ) is labeled the "termination value". When the firm decides to undertake the investment, its expected return is known. The expected return of waiting (the second term in the brackets) is usually referred to as the "continuation value". The firm's optimal decision maximizes the net present value of the investment option F ES . As soon as the termination value exceeds the continuation value, the investment is undertaken. The energy price for which this is just the case will be referred to as the critical energy price P E ES * .
Applying Ito calculus, the following differential equation is obtained:
where φ is the market price of risk and ρ PM the correlation coefficient between market risk and the riskiness of the energy price (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 185 ).
If we try the function F AP ES E = β and solve the differential equation, two roots can be found:
The term β captures the impact of price uncertainty on the critical energy price level at which the switch towards the energy-saving technology will be carried out. The general solution is of the form 2 1 2 1 ) (
where β 1 and β 2 represent the roots. One root is positive, β 1 >1, and one is negative, say β 2 . The higher the energy price, the higher the value of the energy-saving investment option. This implies that the term with the negative root can be ignored: A 2 equals zero. Then the critical value of the energy price can be determined by using two additional conditions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Pindyck, 1991) . First, in the optimum it must hold that at the critical energy price level, the value of the investment project is equal to the termination value: F
ES ES
= Ω : given the fact the investment is undertaken, waiting apparently no longer has a positive net value (see equation (5) = Ω , where subindex P denotes the partial derivative towards P E . Using these two additional conditions, it can be found that the critical price level above which a firm invests in an energysaving technology equals
This critical price level is positive since r> Note that according to the NPV rule, the investments would be carried out as soon as:
The critical value under uncertainty, irreversibility and flexibility with respect to the timing of the investment decision exceeds the NPV's critical value because
After the switch towards the energy-saving technology, the energy price may fall such that the firm may decide to reverse its decision and to re-install an energyintensive (but labour-saving) technology. In each period, it weighs the benefits of reversing now and the benefits of postponing the switch:
Hence,
Again, we try function F AP This time only the negative root (β 2 ) plays a role: the lower the energy price, the higher the likelihood that the reversal will be profitable and hence the higher the value of the reversal option. Using F
EI EI
= Ω and F P EI P
EI
= Ω , it can be found that 
The implications of investing under uncertainty
The analysis presented above implies that there is an asymmetry in the response to energy price increases and decreases. The existence of adjustment costs, high expected rates of energy price increases and uncertainty about future prices drive a wedge between the critical energy price for a switch towards labour-intensive technologies, and the critical price for its reversal. Hence, in response to a price increase, investments will be undertaken. But a subsequent (moderate) drop in energy prices will not induce the reversal towards the energy-intensive technology.
Figure 2 Inertia price gaps as a function of the expected rate of energy price
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This point is illustrated in Figure 2 , where critical energy price lines are drawn for various time trends and for two levels of uncertainty (σ = 0.01 and σ = 0.05). From Figure 2 it is clear that there is a gap (an area between the two critical energy price levels) where prices can fluctuate without firms adapting their production technologies. Expectations about future price developments play an important role in deciding whether or not to invest in energy-saving technology. Indeed, the critical price lines demonstrate that a higher (expected) price trend induces the firm to invest sooner (although the reduction is not substantial), but more importantly that the energy price should be much lower before the firm will start contemplating to reverse its decision. The reason is that high trend values compensate for stochastic drops in the energy price. The reversal will thus only take place if the actual energy price is quite low: only then can it be expected to stay at a low level for a substantial period of time (see equation 1). Furthermore, the higher the uncertainty with respect to future prices, the longer a firm will postpone investing: the higher the uncertainty, the larger the inertia gap.
It is clear that the asymmetry in the response to energy price changes will increase with α and σ. If the upper critical level (i.e., switch towards labour-intensive technology) has just been attained, the firm will undertake the investment. However, to reverse that decision, the energy price should drop substantially. For a large range of price decreases, nothing will happen in terms of energy use. The size of the inertia gap is larger (i) the higher the expected rate of price increase and (ii) the more uncertainty about future price levels. Of course, adaptation costs (C A ) also play a role: the higher these costs, the larger the inertia gap.
Threshold estimation
We have gathered data on a panel of eight sectors of industry for the Dutch economy:
agriculture, food and beverages, textiles and clothing, paper industry, basic metal The implication of the analysis above is that regression functions are not identical across all observations in the sample: the response to energy price changes is typically asymmetrical. To avoid an arbitrary selection of thresholds we estimate the threshold using threshold regression methods with sector-specific fixed effects (Hansen, 1999) . If we have a balanced panel of observations (i=1,…,n sectors and t=1,…,T time periods), we can write the equation of interest as for two thresholds as:
where x it is a k-vector, and q it is the threshold variable and 1 and 2 are the thresholds, I is an indicator function that has a value one if the argument is true and zero otherwise. The error term is iid with mean zero and finite variance. 7 The threshold is estimated using least squares. The observations are first sorted on the threshold variable and the search for the thresholds is restricted to specific quantiles (the more quantiles the finer the grid to which the search is limited). This reduces the number of regressions and still generates sufficiently precise estimates (see Hansen, 1999, p. 5 There are three main sources of the data: volumes and prices of value added and labour are taken from the P-series of the National Accounts 1997 of CBS Statistics Netherlands (CBS, 1998) . Data on the stock of capital in 1990-prices are provided by the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Data on the use of energy and the price of energy are based on the publication De Nederlandse Energiehuishouding (CBS, various issues). Some data series had to be constructed; the methodology applied is described in Appendix A. More information is available in Kuper and Van Soest (1999) . 6 It is possible to calculate triple thresholds instead of two as in equation (14).
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This iid assumption rules out lagged dependent variables.
349-350). Bootstrapping simulates the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio
test. This test is used to test whether the threshold effect is statistically significant under the null of no threshold. If the null is rejected, similar tests are used to test whether there are one, two or even more thresholds.
In line with our theoretical specification, we take as threshold variable the price of energy relative to the nominal wage rate. Next, we define the explanatory variable y it as the rate of growth of the stock of capital, i.e. net investment divided by the stock of capital, and x it as a 3-dimensional vector of regressors, again in rates of growth, consisting of the ratio of the user cost of capital over the wage rate (R/W), the ratio of the price of energy over the wage rate (P E /W), and the growth rate of gross value added (X). This equation captures the substitution effect as well as an accelerator effect. The sector-specific fixed effect which is included picks up the rate of depreciation, so that the explanatory variable is the ratio of gross investment over the stock of capital. This specification is a simple accelerator investment equation including percentage changes of relative prices. We interpret this equation in the following way. Changes in relative prices lead firms to invest in machines with different technologies. This change of technology is represented by changes in input intensities which in turn reflects the change in relative prices. The increase in the growth rate of value added leads firms to invest more in machines with unchanged input intensities, i.e. firms invest more in existing technologies.
We have a balanced panel consisting of 8 sectors of industry and 16 years of observation (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) . We specify 100 quantiles to limit the search and use 300 bootstrap replications to construct asymptotically valid p-values. We define the ratio of energy prices to the wage rate as threshold variable. However, the accelerator differs across regimes. We have identified two thresholds which implies that there are three regimes: P E /W P E /W P E /W>2.60. It is interesting to know which years and which sectors fall in each of the regimes. Tables 2 and 3 How do we interpret these results? Relative prices seem to matter most in the chemical industry and the basic metal industry if prices of energy drop relative to wages, i.e. the accelerator effect in these sectors is small and insignificant. This may induce a (faster) return to more energy-using technologies. Other sectors are more reluctant to return to earlier energy-using technologies. These sectors are perhaps hurt more by the earlier rise in energy-prices, and are locked in energy-saving technologies in the sense that these sectors may not find it profitable to return to technologies that reflect the current low energy-prices. Taxing energy in the sectors locked in older technologies will not be very effective. If we re-scale the prices such that in the base-year P E =R =1, K and E can be calculated in base-year prices. Then composite output Z is simply Z=K+E.
This means that we can calculate the price index of this combined output Z as a weighted average of the price indices of the constituent parts:
Dividing expressions (A.1) and (A.2) yields the volume of input Z.
The (nominal) user cost of capital is not calculated in the usual way. 8 Here,
we made use of data on the stock of capital (measured in 1990-prices) kindly provided by CPB, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. We constructed capital income resulting from production as the gross operating surplus corrected for wage income of self-employed, were self-employed earn the same wage rate as employees. The nominal rental price of capital is now simply calculated as capital income (in current prices) divided by the stock of capital in 1990-prices. 
